Two-level periodic marketing networks without market news  by Zemanian, A.H
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS 68, 509-525 (1979) 
Two-Level Periodic Marketing Networks without Market News 
A. H. ZEMANIAN 
Departmetat of Electrical Engineering, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
Stony Brook, New York 11794 
Submitted by M. Aoki 
A model is constructed for a two-level periodic marketing network wherein 
traders buy goods from farmers in a number of spatially separated markets and 
transport them to urban centers for sale to consumers. It is assumed that there 
is no market news dissemination. As a result, market disturbances are trans- 
mitted throughout the network at a rate limited by the trading activity. More- 
over, distant markets may even be isolated from local disturbances. This model 
possesses one and only one equilibrium state. That equilibrium state is asymp- 
totically stable if the slopes of the various supply and demand functions are 
sufficiently restricted in the vicinity of the equilibrium state. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In certain African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Sierra Leone there 
exist two-level marketing systems having essentially no market news [4]. Figure 1 
is a schematic representation of such a system. The nodes m, , where j = 1, 
2, 3,..., denote farmers’ markets and the nodes nh: , where k = 1,2, 3,..., denote 
consumers’ markets for a particular commodity. The farmers’ markets open 
periodically, perhaps one day out of every four days. We shall assume that the 
market days for every m, occur at the odd integer values of the time variable 
t: t L . . . . -3, -1, I, 3 ,... . At each t farmers in the rural areas of some geo- 
graphic region bring their supplies of the commodity to the mj and sell them to 
traders. The traders in turn transport those supplies to the urban centers of 
the region and sell them to consumers between the times t and t + 2. As a 
notational convenience we shall assume that these sales to urban consumers 
occur at the even integer time values t + 1. Each urban center comprises one 
consumers’ market nk . We assume that perfect competition occurs in every m, 
and every n, . In addition there is local demand in each m, . Thus, in mj traders 
are competing not only among themselves as buyers but also against domestic 
consumers. 
Furthermore, there is essentially no market news for the dissemination of 
price and quantity conditions in the various markets. In fact, Jones [4; p. 1161 
reports the tendency of traders “to buy regularly in the same producing centers, 
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and not to know what prices are elsewhere, or if they do, to buy there. Further 
than this, traders in most of the commodities included in our study confess to 
knowing very little about prices in nearby towns that are also consuming centers.” 
We shall idealize this situation by assuming that each trader restricts his 
activities to one farmers’ market and one consumers’ market and is ignorant 
of the conditions of the markets in which he does not trade. 
“k-l 
“k 
“k+l 
FIGURE 1 
In this paper we develop a mathematical analysis of such a two-level marketing 
system. It is based upon some assumed behavior for the agents in the system 
as expressed by various supply and demand curves. These lead to a system of 
nonlinear recursion equations from which time series in the prices and quantities 
exchanged can be recursively computed. We then show that the qualitative 
behavior described by Jones [4; p. 1191 for the propagation of a disturbance 
throughout the marketing system is reproduced by our model. Furthermore, 
we prove that every marketing system satisfying our assumptions has one and 
only one equilibrium state for a given set of supply curves in the farmers’ 
markets. That equilibrium state is asymptotically stable if the supply and 
demand curves satisfy certain sufficiently strong restrictions on their slopes. 
We have previously given another analysis [8], [9] of this kind of marketing 
system, but the present analysis adopts a radically different approach. The 
prior work assumes that traders maintain conceptions of normal prices in the 
markets and adjust the amounts they buy in the farmers’ markets in accordance 
with the deviations of prices from their normal values. Moreover, the resulting 
analysis has points of similarity with the classical cobweb phenomenon. (See, 
for example, [2], [3], [6], and [7].) The present work assumes that each trader 
has a normal capacity for shipment (e.g., the size of his truck) and adjusts his 
demand schedule at the beginning of each market day in his farmers’ market 
in accordance with his last received price in his consumers’ market and his cost 
of transportation. 
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Other differences between these works are as follows. The basic equations 
governing the dynamic behavior of the system are somewhat simpler in the 
former work, although their derivation is more complicated. Also, the assump- 
tions imposed there seem to be less realistic than those of the present work. 
In fact, the most severe assumption of the former work is that the price elasticity 
of demand (of anticipated supply) in mi (respectively, in Q) for the aggregate 
of all traders operating between mj and nk is independent of Fz (respectively, j). 
One result of this is that all the traders in a consumers’ market might cut off 
their activities if price deviations become too large. But, if they do, they do so 
simultaneously and can never recover activity once it has stopped. Consequently, 
the former work is restricted to moderate price deviations around normal 
values. No such assumption of common elasticities is imposed in this work, and, 
although trading can cutoff, it will restart once price conditions return to more 
normal values. Still another fundamental difference is that the former work 
requires the supply curves of the farmers in the MQ to be perfectly inelastic, 
whereas the present work takes those curves to be sloping. On the other hand, 
it should be pointed out that the former work, having more structure, leads to 
certain interesting mathematical questions that do not arise in the present work. 
So, although the present work is perhaps more realistic and allows stronger 
conclusions to be drawn, the former work remains of interest from the mathe- 
matical point of view. 
2. THE MODEL 
We assume throughout that the two-level marketing network ;V, illustrated 
in Figure 1, has a finite connected simple graph, which is bipartite with respect 
to the partition of its nodes into the set of farmers’ markets and the set of con- 
sumers’ markets. There exists a branch joining a farmers’ market and a con- 
sumers’ market if and only if there are traders available for transporting goods 
between those two markets. In each farmers’ market mi at time t, the farmers 
supply the quantity S’,(p, t) if the price is p, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, the 
supply curves are allowed to shift from one market day to another. In fact, for 
each value of t, the supply schedules S,(p, t) are determined exogenously by 
the harvest and do not depend upon prior prices if time is restricted to spans 
of several months. At the beginning of the harvest season, &(p, t) would be in 
the upper left-hand corner of Figure 2. As the harvest progressed, it would shift 
downward and to the right and then would return to the upper left-hand corner 
as the harvest season came to a close. For larger time spans, several harvest 
seasons would be included, and the corresponding supply schedules would 
depend upon average prices in prior harvest seasons. Our model does not 
account for this and therefore is restricted to time spans that are no longer than 
one growing season. 
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FIGURE 2 
On the other hand, we take domestic demand from local consumers at mj to 
be determined by the fixed demand curve L,(p) shown in Figure 2. (Essentially 
the same analysis would hold if we allowed Lj to shift from one market day to 
another.) 
To model the aggregate behavior of all the traders between two given markets) 
say, mj and lzlc ,we first postulate the behavior of the ith individual trader between 
those markets as follows. That trader restricts his activities to the markets mj 
and n, and may or may not transport goods between them depending on the 
prices. In particular, at time t he views the last received price Ps(t - 1) in nk 
as the most likely value of Pk(t + 1). The trader can be viewed as a firm sup- 
plying the service of transportation from mj to nk , and the goods he buys in mj 
(which are the same as the goods he supplies in nk) are a factor of production 
for him. The amount of those goods will depend upon 
Pk(t - 1) - T,“,c - R,(t), (1) 
where R,(t) is the price in mj at t and T& is a positive number reflecting the 
minimum average variable cost of transportation from mj to ltlc . We assume 
that T& depends on i but not on t. We also assume that each trader possesses 
a limited capacity for the transportation of goods. He refuses to acquire any 
goods in m, at t if (1) is negative, but, as (1) increases into positive values, the 
amount he buys rapidly increases until his capacity is filled. In short, we assume 
that the demand curve of the ith individual trader looks like the curve of 
Figure 3. 
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FIGURE 3 
FIGURE 4 
Since there can be many traders between mi and nk each having perhaps a 
different T,$ , the aggregate demand curve in m, for all those traders will look 
like that of Figure 4, where Tjk = min, Tic is the largest price difference 
pk(t - 1) - R,(t) below which all traders between mj and nlc will refuse to 
acquire goods in m, . In accordance with the preceding paragraph, we shall 
assume that the aggregate demand curve in mj at t of all the traders between m5 
and nk is given by 
V3arw - 1) - Ta-PI (2) 
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where V,,(x) is a continuous function on --E < x ‘< m that equals zero for 
N < 0, is strictly increasing for J > 0, and tends to a finite limit V,,<(KI) as 
x ---f co. The stipulation that the monotonicity of Vj, be strict on the positive 
real line is imposed to avoid certain technical problems of a mathematical 
nature; it can be supported by noting that traders will tend to stretch their 
transportation capacities (perhaps by overloading their trucks) as anticipated 
profits become more and more lucrative. 
Given any node ‘z: of a graph, we define the adjacency of v as the set of all 
nodes that are adjacent to V. 
The aggregate demand curve Dj(p, t) in mj at t is the sum of the demand 
curves for the local consumers and the various traders at mj . Thus, 
Dj(P> 6 = -b(P) + & vjk[Pk(t - l) - Tjk - PI 
, 
(3) 
where Kj is the index set for the adjacency of mj . The price R,(t) at which the 
market mj clears at t is the value of p for which 
Q(p, t) = qp, 4. (4) 
Under the assumptions stated below there will be one and only one such value 
R,(t). Consequently, the amount acquired by the local consumers is L,[&(t)], 
and the amount transported by the traders from mj to nlc for sale at t + 1 is 
Sjk(t) = Vjk[Pk(t - 1) - Tjk - l+(t)]. (5) 
We next assume that traders do not store goods; they sell the goods they have 
on hand at time t + 1 for whatever price they can get. Thus, the supply curve 
in nk at time t + 1 is completely inelastic; that is, it is a vertical line intersecting 
the quantity axis at the value 
c,(t) = 1 ‘%k@) 
jdk 
(6) 
where Jk is the index set of the adjacency of nk . On the other hand, we take the 
demand curve H,(p) for the consumers in nk to be fixed with time and of the 
shape shown in Figure 5. Thus, the market nk will clear at a unique price 
Pk(t + 1) if the inverse G, of the demand curve H, is a well-defined function on 
0 < 9 < 0~). We shall relax this condition a bit by allowing G*(O) to be either 
finite or infinite. Thus, we may write 
J’rc(t + 1) = Gc[W)l. 
In the event that C,(t - 2) = 0 and Pk(t - 1) = co, the value used for (5) in 
(3) and (6) (as well as in (8) and (9) below) is the finite number Vjlc(co). 
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FIGURE 5 
Upon combining equations (3, (9, (5), (6), and (7) we obtain the two basic 
equations for our model: For every j, 
WW), tl = ~,[~j(t>l + C Ilj@& - 1) - Tj,c - &WI 
keKj 
and, for every k, 
(8) 
pk(t + 1) = Gk & vik[Pk(t - 1) - Tjk - &@)I . 
I I 
(9) 
We now list all the assumptions that we shall impose on the various supply 
and demand functions of the marketing network N throughout this paper. 
Conditions I: 
I r . L,(p) is a continuous nonnegative function on 0 < p < 0~) and 
strictly decreasing on 0 < p < RF < 00. If Rf < co, L,(p) = 0 on Rj* < 
p < co. If Rj* = co, L,(p) -+ 0 asp -+ 00. (See Figure 2.) 
I a . For each fixed t, &(p, t) is a continuous nonnegative function on 
0 < p < co, equal to zero on 0 < p < R,“(t), and strictly increasing on 
R,“(t) < p < co, where R,“(t) < Rf. (See Figure 2.) Also, S&J, t) + CO as 
p-+ 00. 
I s . vjk(x) is a continuous nonnegative function on -cc < x < Co such 
that v&x) = 0 for x < 0, vjk( x is strictly increasing on 0 < x < co, and ) 
V,,(x) tends to a finite limit Vjk(co) as x + co. Moreover, it satisfies the 
Lipschitz condition 
I ~~44 - V,,(Y)~ G M I x -Y I 
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everywhere. (Since the marketing network Nis finite, we can take the constant M 
to be independent ofj and k.) 
I 4. G,(q) is a continuous positive strictly decreasing function on 0 < 
q < co. As q -+ co, Gk(q) -+ 0. As q --+ Of, G,(q) tends to PC, where Pz can 
be either a finite number or co. We set G,(O) = Pj$. (See Figure 5.) 
These conditions and a specification of the initial prices Pk(0) for all k such 
that 0 < P,(O) < P$ allow us to compute recursively the price series {R,(t): 
t = 1, 3, 5 ,... } and {Pk(t + 1): t = 1, 3, 5 ,... > for all j and k. Indeed, since 
RjS < RF, the continuities and strict monotonicities of S,(p, 1) and D,(p, 1) 
dictate that for each j there is a unique positive value R,(l) for which (8) is 
satisfied. The corresponding values for the Sjk( 1) are all nonnegative and finite, 
and therefore (9) yields the nonnegative values P,(2) for all k. The computations 
proceed in this fashion. 
It will be understood throughout this work that the initial value of Pk(t + 1) 
will be restricted according to Ph(t + 1) < P$. All subsequent values of 
Pk(t + 1) satisfy this restriction. Note that, when P$ = co, the time series in 
the Pk(t + 1) may have cc as some of its terms. Indeed, when C,(t) = 0, we 
have Pk(t + 1) = P$. In this case we set Sjk(t + 2) equal to the limiting 
value Vjk(~). But, since the latter is finite, the computations continue without 
difficulty. 
Also, note that 
Hence, 
for t > 1. 
f’dt + 1) b G(C*) > 0 (11) 
3. THE PROPAGATION OF DISTURBANCES 
W. 0. Jones [4; p, 1191 has pointed out that a two-level marketing network 
without market news responds only sluggishly to disturbances in supplies at 
the farmers’ markets. In particular, suppose a shortage of supplies occurs at 
some farmers’ market m, . The resulting price disturbances will be propagated 
through the marketing system only by means of the trading activities. As a 
result, a rise in price due to the supply shortage can appear at a distant market 
no sooner than the minimum time it takes for a signal to be transmitted in a 
step-by-step fashion along the shortest path connecting mi to that distant 
market. We shall show in this section that our model possesses this qualitative 
behavior and moreover that the time lag before the price rise occurs in the 
distant market may actually be longer than the aforementioned minimum 
transmittal time. 
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The length of a path joining two nodes of N is the number of edges in the 
path. The distance between those two nodes is the smallest length among all 
the paths joining those nodes. It follows from the governing equations (8) and (9) 
that it takes at least d units of time for a disturbance to travel a distance d. We 
will assume that a disturbance occurs at the farmers’ market m, . For t = 3, 
5, 7,..., let Yt (or 2,-i) denote the set of indices of those mi (respectively, nk) 
that are at a distance t - 1 (respectively, t - 2) from m, . Yr will denote the 
set consisting only of the index 1. Because N is bipartite, no two nodes in Yt are 
adjacent, and the same is true for .7-r . 
Let y denote either a farmers’ market or a consumers’ market. Choose a 
shortest path between m, and y and let {b,},“=, be the sequence of branches met 
as one traces the path from m, to y. In the following we will be considering two 
different dynamic processes in N and will denote the variables of each dynamic 
process by the superscript i, where i = 1,2. If s is odd (even), we let F,i(s) 
(respectively, FSi(s + 1)) denote the amount of goods flowing along b, that were 
acquired in a farmers’ market at time s (respectively, s + 1) for sale in a con- 
sumers’ market at time s + 1 (respectively, s + 2). The resulting sequence 
W(l), F,i(3), F,i(3), Psi(5), F5Y5),-1 (12) 
will be called an m, toy passage for the ith process. We shall say that a coincident 
cutoff occurs for the two passages if there exists a term in the sequence that is 
zero for both values of i. 
THEOREM 1. Let the superscripts 1 and 2 denote two dz&rent dynamic processes 
in N. Assume that 
(a) Pkl(0) = Pk2(0) < P$ for all k, 
(/3) S,l(p, 1) < &“(p, 1) for allp such that S12(p, 1) > 0, and 
(7) S,l(p, t) = SF@, t) for allp > 0, for allj f 1, andfor all t = 1, 3, 5 
,... . 
Then, for every odd positive integer t, we have the following conclusions: 
(a) For j E Yt , R>(t) > RF(t). Strict inequality holds if and only if there 
exists at least one m, to mj passage having no coincident cutofJ. (Thus, for j = 1, 
strict inequality holds.) 
(b) For jg Yt+z u Yr+a u .‘., Rj’(t) = Rj2(t). 
(4 For h E -G+, , Pkl(t + 1) 3 Pk2(t + 1). Strict inequality holds if and 
only if there exists at least one m, to nk passage having no coincident cutoff. 
(d) For k E &+, u .&+, u ---, Pkl(t + 1) = Pk2(t + 1). 
Note: We interpret hypotheses (a), (/3), and (y) to mean that the conditions 
at all the markets other than m, are the same for both processes and that a 
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shortfall in supply has occurred in m, at t = 1 for the first process but not for 
the second.) 
Proof. It follows from (a) that D,l(p, 1) = D,2(p, I). So, by virtue of (p), 
the strict monotonicities of the Dli and Sri functions, and the condition that 
Rjs(t) < Rf for both processes, we have R,1(1) > Ri2(1). Now, let K E Z, . By 
the strict monotonicity of Vi, , we also have S&.( 1) < S&(l) except when 
Rr2( 1) > Pk2(0) - Tjk . In the latter case, S:,(l) = Szk(l) = 0; thus, coin- 
cident cutoff occurs on the m, to nk passage, that is, at time t = 1 on the branch 
connecting m, to nk . Moreover, it is clear that R,‘(l) = R,“(l) for j E Ys u 
Y5 u ‘... 
Since conditions are the same at all the other farmers’ markets at t = 1, we 
have S,f,(l) = S,“,(l) for j E Ys and k E Z, . But, Cki(l) = CjeJ, S&(l), where 
i = 1,2. Consequently, for k E Z, , C,l(l) < Ck2(1) and therefore, by the strict 
monotonicity of G, , P,l(2) 2 Pk2(2). We h ave strict inequalities here if and 
only if coincident cutoff does not occur on the m, to nL passage. On the other 
hand, for k E Z, u Z, u ..., we have C,i( 1) = Ck2(1) and therefore Plc1(2) = 
Pk2W. 
We now construct an inductive proof. Assume that, for some t > 3, (c) and 
(d) both hold with t replaced by t - 2. That is: 
(i) For k E Z,-, , Pkl(t - 1) > Pk2(t - 1). The inequalities are strict if 
and only if there exists at least one nzi to nk passage having no coincident cutoff. 
(ii) For K E Z,,, u Z,,, u ..., Pal(t - 1) = Pk2(t - 1). 
We have shown above that these conditions hold for t = 3. Now, upon 
combining (i) and (ii), we have that for j E Yt , where t 2 3, D,l( p, t) >, Dj2( p, t) 
with strict inequality holding for at least some p under the condition stated in (i). 
Since Sii(p, t) = Sj2(p, t) by (y), it follows from the monotonicities of the 
Dt and Sji that Rjl(t) 3 Rj2(t) where j E Y, . Strict inequality will occur if and 
only if the supply curve S,l(p, t) = Sj2(p, t) intersects the D,‘(p, t) curve at a 
point different from that for D,“(p, t) curve. But, this occurs if and only if there 
is at least one K E Z,-, for which the condition of (i) for strict inequality holds 
and in addition S&(t) > 0. In other words, R,l(t) > R,“(t) if and only if there 
is some m, to mj passage having no coincident cutoff. Thus, all of assertion (a) 
has been obtained. 
Assertion (b) follows directly from (ii) and (y). 
Next, for j E Yt and k E Z,+I , where t > 3, we have from (ii) that 
VjJPkl(t - 1) - TjTc -p] = Vjk[P7:(t - 1) - Tjle -p] 
for all p. Hence, if R,l(t) > RF(t) and if Rj2(t) < Pk2(t - 1) - Tj,, we have 
from the strict monotonicity of the V&x) for x > 0 that S$t) < S&(t). On 
the other hand, S&(t) = S&(t) if either R>(t) = RF(t) or R,“(t) 2 Pk2(t - 1) - 
Tjk . The former case holds if and only if there is coincident cutoff in every mr to 
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mi passage, and the latter case holds if and only if S&(t) = $(t) = 0 (i.e., 
coincident cutoff occurs in the mi to nk branch). Thus, we have shown that 
S&.(t) < &(t) and that strict inequality holds if and only if there is at least one 
m, to nlc passage having no coincident cutoff. On the other hand, for j E Yt+2 u 
YtfPv ... and kEZ,+,uZ,+,u ..‘, we clearly have from (ii) and (y) that 
&q*(t) = S$(t). 
By virtue of the sttict monotonicities of the G, , these results on the Sjlc’s 
immediately imply (c) and (d), which completes our inductive proof. 
4. THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM STATE 
We now wish to determine whether it is possible for the various prices and 
quantities in our marketing network to be fixed with respect to time. We say 
that N is in equilibrium if S,(p, t), &(t), and Pk(t) are independent of t for every 
j and k. By an equilibrium state for N we mean the corresponding set of all Rj 
and Pk . The governing equations for an equilibrium are obtained by deleting 
the time variable from the equations (8) and (9). That is, for every j 
W,) =URi) + ,g, T/iAPrc - Tjle - R,), 
1 
and for every k 
1 Vjjk(Pk - Tjk - Rj) . 
id, 1 
(13) 
(14) 
Note that, under Conditions I and for any assumed values of the Pk such that 
0 < Pr, < P;, (13) h as a unique positive solution Rj for every j. Therefore, 
the question at hand is whether (14) h as a nonnegative solution Pr, when the Ri 
are determined by (13). 
In the following we shall use the demand functions H,(p) in the nR . In 
accordance with Condition I, , each Hk is a continuous positive strictly decreasing 
function on 0 < p < Pi. It tends to co asp + Of. If P$ is finite, H*(P$) = 0. 
If Pz = co, H,(p) + 0 as p -+ co. In the latter case, we also write H,(P$) = 
Hk(co) = 0. 
In this and the next two sections we assume that each mj has a fixed supply 
function Sj _ 
THEOREM 2. The marketing network N has at least one equilibrium state. 
Proof. For each k we will construct a finite or infinite nonincreasing sequence 
of values for each of the Pk which will either end at or tend toward a value for 
that Pfi corresponding to an equilibrium state for N. 
We start by setting all P* = P$, which we also denote by Pk,O . Let Rj,, be 
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the corresponding unique solution of (13) f or eachj. We now generate sequences 
of values for P, and Rj whose terms we index by the second subscript s = 
0, 1) 2 ,... . Since H,(P,,o) = 0 whereas 
jzti ‘d’k,o - Tik - Rj,o) >, 0, 
we have 
j&k vik(pk,s - Tjk - 4,s) 3 Hk(pk.s) (15) 
for all K when s = 0. If equality holds in (15) for all tz, then we have found an 
equilibrium state, namely, the set of all Rj,o and Pk., . (In this case, all Sjk = 0.) 
If not, then there is strict inequality in (15) for at least one K. Let h be the 
number of consumers’ markets. Choose the first integer /z in the ordered set 
(1,2,..., h), say K1 for which there is strict inequality in (15). As P*, decreases 
from the value Pkl,, = P$ and all other P,,, (K # K,) are held fixed, the curve 
Vjk,(Pk - Tikl - p) shift: (downward in Figure 2) for each j whereas all the 
other Gjk(Pk - Tjk - p) remain fixed. Therefore, the value Dj(p) decreases 
or stays fixed at each value of p 2 0. By the strict monotonicity of the Si , 
the values of Rj and Qj both decrease so long as Dj(p) actually decreases for 
every p in a neighborhood of the initial Rj . Because of the continuities and 
strict monotonicities of the Vj, for positive values of their arguments, D$(p) 
decreases in that neighborhood for every jE Jk, for which the corresponding 
term in the left-hand side of (15) is greater than zero. But, for /z # ki , 
Vjk(Pk - Tj,, - Rj) wi 11 increase in value or stay fixed at zero as Rj decreases, 
and the same is true for Ii,( S ince Qj equals the right-hand side of (13) and 
actually decreases, we can conclude that Vjlc,(Pk, - Tjkl - Rj) decreases as PIcl 
decreases and Rj takes on the values for which equality holds in (13). This 
process will continue until Vjkl(P,l - Tjk, - Rj) reaches the value zero, 
which occurs before Pk, becomes negative. 
On the other hand, Hkl(Pk ) increases as Pk, decreases from Pkl+ . It follows 
from the continuity of the surpply and demand curves that the decrease in the 
left-hand side and the increase in the right-hand side will be continuous varia- 
tions with respect to P, . As a result, there will be some positive value for Pk, 
for which equality is achieved in (15) (with s deleted) for k = 1;1 . Furthermore, 
for k # iz, the inequality (15) will continue to hold and possibly get larger when 
PksB = Pk,o and the Rjs, are replaced by the values corresponding to equality 
in (13). This is because, for k + K, , Vjk(Pk - Tjh - Rj) increases in value or 
stays fixed as Rj decreases and Pk remains fixed. Let Pk,l = Pk,,, for k # kl , 
but let Pk,,l be the found value of Pk, for which equality is achieved in (15). 
Also, let Rjel denote the corresponding values that satisfy (13). 
Next, choose the first value, say, k, in the ordered set (k, + 1, kl + 2,..., 
k, 1, 2 ,..., k, - 1) for which strict inequality holds in (15) with s = 1. (If no 
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such k, exists, we will have found an equilibrium state. So, assume a K, does 
exist.) Repeat the argument of the preceding two paragraphs, decreasing now 
Pk, instead of Pk. and holding all other Pk fixed. We will obtain a new set of 
values for the Rj and Pk , which we will denote with the subscript s = 2, 
such that (13) is satisfied for allj and, for s = 2, (15) holds for all k with equality 
occurring for k = K, . 
Once again, choose the first value, say, Ka in the ordered set (K, + 1, /Za + 2,..., 
h, 1, 2 ,...) K, - 1) for which strict inequality holds in (15) with s = 2, and 
repeat the above procedure. Continue this process as long as possible. Two 
possibilities arise: 
(i) The process terminates after a finite number of steps because equality 
is acheived in (15) for all k. 
(ii) The process continues indefinitely. 
Under (i), an equilibrium state will have been found. We will now show that, 
under (ii), the sequence {Pk,s}~cl converges for every k to a value Pk,m such 
that equality holds in (14) when Pk = Pksm and the Rj are determined by (13). 
First note that the above process generates a nonincreasing sequence {Ple,s}s”,l 
for each K. Since P k,s 2 G,(C*) > 0 by virtue of (1 i), the sequence converges 
to a positive limit P,,, . Thus, {H,(P,,,)},“=, is a nondecreasing convergent 
sequence tending to the finite limit H,JP,&. 
Let {H,,,}y=“=, and {C,,,}~=r be the sequences of values taken by H,(P,) and 
Ck = &Jk Vjk(Plc - Tjk - Ri) respectively at each step of the above process. 
We have already noted that, as s ---f co, Hkss + H,(P,,,), the H,,, are non- 
decreasing, and H,,, < C,,, . Moreover, for each k there are subsequences uch 
that, for n = 1, 2 ,..., Hk s = CL,s, ; 
HL~ = %s,,-I whereas ‘k, 
also,forn>2ands,-,,<s<s,-1, 
is nondecreasing. (See Figure 6.) Here, the s, 
depend on the choice of k. We wish to show that, for each k, C,,,s -+ Hk(Pk,,). 
By virtue of the continuity of the functions Hk , Vj, , L, , and Sj , this will 
prove that, for P, = Pk,n , equality holds in (14) when the Rj assume the 
unique values for which equality holds in (13). 
’ = ‘k,s 
’ = Hk,s 
0 ooooo --- 
0 ooo a.... 
0 0.. . . 
00 
. 
‘n-1 
sn-I s, S 
FIGURE 6 
522 A. H. ZEMANIAN 
In the following we will be choosing subsequences of subsequences. Out of 
consideration for the typesetter, we introduce the following notation: s:n = s,( . 
Thus, {X,,,,,,,}~~r denotes a subsequence indexed by p of a subsequence indexed 
by v of a subsequence indexed by n of a sequence indexed by s. 
Suppose C,,, does not tend to H1,(Pk,,) as s + 00. Then, there exists an E > 0 
and an infinite subsequence {C,,~,s:,:,~_,}V~, such that 
Ck,(s:n:v)-l - EI,(PJc,co) > E. 
Since Ck,szncv = Hk,sznzv ,< H,.(P,,,,), we have 
G.(s:n:v)--l - G.s:n:” > E- 
Let / Jk / denote the (finite) number of farmers’ markets adjacent to the con- 
sumers’ market nk . Let {Vj,,,,}~~, be the sequence of values assumed by the 
Vjk(Pk - Tj, - Rj) in the aforementioned process. Since the sum over Jk of 
the Vj.k,s equals C,,,Y, there exists a subsequence (Vj,k,s:n:v,u]~z:=l such that 
Consider now the sequence of increments AP,,, by which the value of P, drops 
for the step in the aforementioned process corresponding to the increase in our 
index s from (s:n:v:p) - 1 to s:n:v:~. By virtue of the Lipschitz condition 
satisfied by the Vj, , we must have that 
It follows that P,,, must tend to -CO, in contradiction to the fact that Pk,s > 0. 
Hence, our supposition at the beginning of this paragraph is false. This com- 
pletes the proof. 
5. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STATE 
We now show that N has at most one equilibrium state. 
THEOREM 3. N has one and only one equilibrium state. 
Proof. Suppose there exist two different equilibrium states (i.e., in at least 
one consumers’ market the price under one state is different from the price 
under the other state.) We shall denote the prices and quantities for one state 
with the superscript 1 and those for the other state by the superscript 2. We 
can choose that notation and a value & for K such that Pi, > PE, and 
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for every k. Starting with the first equilibrium state, we shall alter the prices 
in the consumers’ markets in two steps: 
Step 1: Let APk, = Pi0 - Pi0 . Thus, AP,, > 0. Decrease every Pkl by 
APtO.to get the value Pka = P,1 - APk, . (These Pka may not correspond to an 
eqmhbrium state.) Set 
Cka = 1 Vilc(Plia - TjR - Rja) 
jeJb 
where the Rja are the values determined by (13) when Pk = Pka. Since the L, 
and the Vj, are continuous and strictly decreasing and the Sj are continuous 
and strictly increasing whenever their range values are positive, it follows that 
Vjk(Pka - T,,; - R,“) < Vflc(Pk’ - Tjk - R,1) 
for every j and k. Therefore, Cka < C,l. 
Step 2: Keep Pz, = Pi0 fixed, but for every k # k, change the value of Pk 
from Pka to Pk2. Thus, Pk2 - Pka > 0. Consequently, at this step Rj either 
stays fixed or increases in value so that V,,,(P& - TjkO - Rj) either stays fixed 
or decreases in value for every j. As a result, CE, < Cg . 
Upon combining the results of these two steps, we g:t Ci > CE, . But, since 
HkO(p) is strictly decreasing on 0 < p < P$ and 0 < PiI < Pt, < P,$ , we 
have 
Hrc#‘,tJ > H&‘,tJ = C:, 3 CEO .
Thus, the second state cannot be an equilibrium state, in contradiction to our 
assumption. 
6. THE ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STATE 
We continue to assume that the supply functions S,(p) are independent of t. 
Let Zj(q) be the inverse function of S,(p). Thus, Zj(q) is a continuous strictly 
increasing function on 0 < q < Sj( co), where Sj( co) = lim,,, S,(p). The 
right-hand side of (8) will lie in the interval 0 < q < S,(OO) for every j. Thus, 
(8) can be rewritten as 
In order to examine the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium state, we linearize 
the dynamic equations (9) and (16) around the equilibrium state. This can be 
done by taking total derivatives of (9) and (16) with respect to the Pk and Rj and 
then solving the two resulting equations for dP,(t + 1) in terms of dP,(t - 1) 
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by eliminating d&(t). We also assign to the derivatives of the functions G, , 
Vi, , .Zj , and L, the values that they assume in the equilibrium state. We denote 
these values by GA , Vjlk , Zj , and Li respectively. This yields 
Let there be h consumers’ markets. In terms of the vector U,(X) = [O,(X),..., 
&‘,(x)]~ (the superscript T denotes the transpose), the last equation can be 
written in matrix form as w(t + 1) = Aw(t - 1). A is a constant h X h matrix 
whose elements tend to zero as the values G; , V,‘lc , Zj’ , and Lj tend to zero. 
Now, the equilibrium state is asymptotically stable if all the eigenvalues of A 
have absolute values less than one [l; p. 1261. The latter will certainly be the 
case if the absolute values of every entry of A is less than h-l [5; p. 2111. This 
result can be written out explicitly as bounds on the values G; , VJfk , Zj’ , and 
Lj which insure asymptotic stability, but those bounds will be in general much 
more restrictive than need be. In any case, we have the qualitative result that 
the equilibrium state is asymptotically stable if the slopes of the functions Zj , 
Gk , Lj , and I’?, are small enough in neighborhoods of the equilibrium-state 
values of their arguments. This means that, with respect to the axes of Figures 2 
and 5, the functions Zj = S;’ and G, = Hi1 should be flat enough whereas Li 
and Vj, should be steep enough in the vicinity of the equilibrium state. Actually, 
if the commodity at hand is a food product, the supply function Zj and the 
demand function G, will not be particularly flat. But, the demand functions Lj 
and Vi, can be quite steep in the vicinity of the equilibtium state, in fact 
sufficiently so to insure asymptotic stability even when Zj and G, are not so flat. 
7. MORE COMPLICATED MODELS OF ANTICIPATED PRICES 
The model we have discussed so far assumes that at time t traders between mi 
and nk take the last received price PJt - 1) in nk as the anticipated value for 
Pk(t + 1). This is similar to the classical cobweb model [3]. A number of 
authors have modified the cobweb model by using more complicated formulas 
for expected prices. (See, for example, [2], [6], and [7].) Thus, one might 
assume that the mj to nR traders take at time t some weighted average of many 
prior prices in nk as the anticipated value of Pk(t + 1). We denote that weighted 
average by 
&[Plc(t - l), Pk(t - 3), Pk(t - 5),...]. (17) 
This idea can be incorporated into the governing equations for the dynamic 
behavior of our model simply by replacing the term Pk(t - 1) in the right-hand 
sides of (8) and (9) by (17). The recursive computation of the various time 
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series in prices and quantities proceeds as before, but now initial conditions 
must be given on enough prior prices to determine (17) for some t. In general, 
(17) serves to smooth out the effects of disturbances. 
If Bj, is a strictly increasing function of Pk(t - 1) when the Pk(t - 3), 
Pk(t - 5) ... are all held fixed, then Theorem 1 and its proof extend directly 
to our present model. If in addition (17) assumes a certain value whenever all 
the Pk(t - l), Pk(t - 3),... assume that same value, then Theorems 2 and 3 
also hold once again with no changes in their proofs. Finally, the equilibrium 
state will again be asymptotically stable under all the assumptions stated so far 
if we add the requirement that every first partial derivative of B,, with respect 
to each of its arguments as not too large in the vicinity of the equilibrium state. 
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